Project: "Epistemic Basing
Relations"
Advisor: Marshall Swain
A vital, but rarely
examined, necessary condition for a belief's
being justified is that it be based on the relevant reasons. A belief
is
based on a reason when the reason is the (or among the) reason(s) for
which
the belief is held. As William Alston has noted there is no adequate
and
illuminating explanation of the basing relation in the literature. In
my
dissertation, my aim is to provide this sort of explanation.
My own theory of the basing relation, the causal-doxastic theory,
is designed to succeed where other theories of the basing relation have
failed. According to it, a belief is based on a reason either when the
reason causes the belief in the appropriate fashion or there is no such
causal relation, but one has a meta-belief to the effect that the
reason
is a good reason to hold the belief, and that meta-belief has the
appropriate
causal history. I argue that the causal-doxastic theory avoids the
problems
plaguing other theories discussed in the literature.
An adequate theory of the basing relation is relevant to many
current debates in epistemology. For example, the basing relation, on
my
view, sometimes requires a limited degree of introspective access to
the
basing of one's beliefs, hence a limited accessibility internalism is
shown
to be true sans appeal to a conception of justification which ties this
notion to epistemic responsibility or to meeting intellectual
obligations.
Second, inferences are simply a kind of basing relation, so a
conclusive
account of the basing relation also provides an adequate theory of
inference.
Finally, an account of the basing relation is useful for understanding
and defending many different theories of justification. For example, an
adequate theory of the basing relation will help to explain how basic
beliefs
get justified and why they are not incorrigible.